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on various aspects of co-operation between 
Europe and the United States 
Welcoming the desire shown by the United States Government to pursue and develop its co-
operation with Europe in every field ; 
Also welcoming the fact that the United States Government continues to consider the development 
of a European union as a. favourable factor in such co-operation; 
Considering that, in an unfavourable economic situation, recourse to protectionism would be a. 
serious danger for Europe and noting with satisfaction that the United States, like Western Europe, has 
set itself. the aim of progressively freeing international trade ; 
Considering that the creation of the European monetary fund is a major step in the search for the 
balance necessary for developing trade ; 
Considering that Europe's security, based on the Atlantic Alliance, requires improved consulta-
tions between European members and the United States on external policy matters ; 
Considering that such consultations can be improved to the extent that Western Europe manages 
to define a. joint foreign policy itself ; 
Welcoming the success of the SALT II negotiations, but considering that the development of 
strategic arms limitation talks calls for the adoption of joint positions by the European members of 
the Atlantic Alliance and participation by Europe in the SALT III negotiations; 
Welcoming the United States' intention to organise a. two-way street for trade in armaments but 
concerned lest such a. trend should inhibit European co-operation in this field, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance allow them, 
in the presence of their American partners, to uphold an external policy worked out by all the member 
countries of WEU in accordance with their goals of security and freedom of their peoples ; 
2. Study in particular the implications for Europe's defence policy of the Soviet Union's deployment 
of new weapons; 
3. At regular intervals, make a. critical appraisal of the strategic concepts adopted by NATO ; 
4. Ensure that the organisation of European co-operation in armaments production is not hampered 





(submitted by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Close co-operation with the United States 
was n?t Europe:s choice, it was an unescapable 
~ecessity. The role played by the United States 
m the world is such that the currencies of the 
whole world are defined in relation to the dollar 
raw materials prices are fixed on America~ 
~a~kets and United States arms directly or 
mdirectly ensure the security of a large part of 
the world, whereas Europe, united or not, no 
longer has the means for an external or defence 
policy capable of meeting the Soviet challenge, 
whether m Europe or a fortiori in the rest of 
the world. Alone, it cannot contemplate ensuring 
its defence in face of the tremendous nuclear 
and conventional arsenal deployed by the Soviet 
Union. To ensure and organise close co-operation 
with the United States is therefore essential for 
the foreign policy of each of the Western Euro-
pean countries and the concern for greater 
independence sometimes shown by some of them 
has never led them to deny the need for such 
co-operation, although they may have loosened 
or sought to limit certain aspects. 
2. On the American side, co-operation with 
Western Europe also seems necessary insofar as 
the United States alone cannot shoulder all the 
responsibilities stemming from its vocation as 
a world power. Europe's economic, and above 
all commercial, power is essential for the main-
tenance of an international economic order from 
which the United States is the first to benefit. 
Relations between Europe and a large number 
of countries on other continents, particularly in 
Africa, are an important factor of cohesion in 
international society and the return of the 
United States to an isolationist policy reminiscent 
of the situation immediately after the fir8t world 
war now seems unthinkable. Hence the United 
States can no longer view its own security 
as being independent of that of Western Europe 
and if it maintains large conventional and 
nuclear forces in Europe it is not just to fulfil 
an undertaking entered into almost thirty years 
ago, it is because it is now essential. 
3. However, co-operation between Europe and 
the United States raises a problem insofar as 
the yY estern Europea~ countries are steadfastly 
movmg towards particularly close co-operation 
among themselves with the aim of setting up a 
European union whose shape and institutions 
are· still uncertain. In every field therefore the 
question arises as to whether priority should 
be given to intra-European co-operation, i.e. 
the building of Europe, or to co-operation 
between Europe and the United States. To 
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pursue these two aims simultaneously is certainly 
n~c~sary but, i.n practice, it is often very 
difficult to avoid having to choose between 
policies leading in one or other of two directions. 
In this report, consideration will be given to 
what form of co-operation with the United 
States would not affect the search for a Euro-
pean union for which the Americans continue 
to voice their strong support. 
4. In fact, it is not the deliberate wish of the 
United States that transatlantic co-operation 
should clash with European union. During its 
visit to the United States from 19th to 
23rd March 1979, the Committee saw that the 
present government is just as intent as its 
predecessors, if not more so, on asserting its 
twofold desire to co-operate closely with Europe 
and to encourage the development of the Euro-
pean union. On this point, the Committee heard 
no dissonant voice. But co-operation with a 
Europe anxious to continue the process of 
unification encounters a number of obstacles 
based not on opposition to principles but on 
practice dominated by facts, many of which are 
beyond the free choice of either side. 
5. One obstacle is the way the democratic 
system works in the United States. American 
society as a whole is not well i¢ormed about 
matters outside the American continent and like 
. ' any society - but perhaps to a greater degree 
because of the size and mass of American 
territory - it views world · problems only 
through the screen of national politics. It is 
therefore inevitable that those governing the 
United States, and to an even greater extent 
American parliamentarians, should be extremely 
sensitive to the reactions of the electorate which 
sees the world's realities through the prism of 
its own affairs. President Carter's difficulties 
in imposing a real energy policy on American 
society is further proof, if proof were needed, 
of this difficulty facing the world's greatest 
power in pursuing a policy which conforms to 
its world vocation. 
6. Moreover, the United States Government 
itself, although quite sincere in declaring that 
co-operation with Europe is one of its foremost 
concerns, also has to meet other requirements 
which, perforce, at times take priority over 
everything else. 
7. First is the security of the United States 
and its territory. Admittedly, the Americans are 
probably almost unanimous in considering that 
United States security depends on that of 
Europe but they may not have the same view 
of two different aspects of American security. 
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For instance, the idea of a conventional, or even 
a nuclear war if limited to the use of theatre 
weapons on the mainland of Europe, is not 
unthinkable for the American authorities. Your 
Rapporteur was able to note that on many 
occasions the Americans whom the Committee 
met asserted, either deliberately or as a slip 
of the tongue, that the aim of American policy 
was to avoid any nuclear war. Many Europeans 
would refrain from making such statements 
because they consider that even a conventional 
war on the territory of Europe would be as 
fearsome as nuclear war and consequently 
NATO's policy of deterrence should seek to 
avoid all forms of war and not just nuclear war. 
8. Second, the United States is very interested 
in reaching agreement with the Soviet Union, 
particularly on all matters relating to strategic 
weapons. The very aim of agreement is to 
eliminate the risk of nuclear war as far as 
possible, and, secondarily, to develop peaceful 
coexistence between the two great powers. But 
such agreement has to be based on negotiations 
in which Europeans can take no part although 
the matters discussed are of direct concern to 
them such as those relating to the level of forces 
and weapons not only in Europe itself but 
throughout the world. 
9. Third, the range of resources available to 
the United States has induced it, on a number of 
economic matters of world importance, to adopt 
positions determined by somewhat different 
requirements to those of Europe. For instance, 
a restriction on international trade would harm 
Europe far more than the United States in view 
of the relative importance of its trade. But an 
increase in raw material prices and particularly 
in oil prices may make the United States 
increase its own production even if the cost 
price of American oil is relatively high, whereas 
Europe with hardly any resources to develop 
will have to bear the cost of any price increases. 
10. Finally, events anywhere in the world may 
make the Americans turn their foreign policy 
in a particular direction without European 
concerns having any influence on their action 
or assessment of the situation. For instance, 
where American policy towards the Middle East 
is concerned, members of the General Affairs 
Committee were able to see that there were wide 
differences in the various assessments of United 
States action. 
11. Moreover, while American policy is in 
principle in favour of the establishment of a 
European union it has to take Europe as it is, 
i.e. as a group of countries in which most 
political and even economic decisions are still 
taken at the level of national states. It cannot 
therefore be blamed for increasing bilateral steps 
for developing its trade with each individual 
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European country or some of them. Moreover, 
the Americans are not the losers since their 
partners, being weaker and le~ competitive, are 
not so well placed for negotiations. But one 
may wonder how far the development of these 
partial or bilateral relations with Europe is 
not contrary to the establishment of a European 
union. 
12. Two recent examples illustrate this alter-
native. One concerns the arms trade. In 1978 
the Americans increased their bilateral agree-
ments with the European member countries of 
NATO with a view to activating trade in arms. 
But whatever reservations may have been 
written into these agreements in favour of Euro-
pean co-operation it is not evident that increased 
.trade really helps Europe's attempts to ration-
alise production and co-operate more closely in 
this field. 
13. The other example concerns general policy : 
the summit meeting in Guadeloupe in February 
1979. Anxious to consult European partners, 
President Carter met President Giscard 
d'Estaing, Chancellor Schmidt and Mr. 
Callaghan, the British Prime Minister. These 
three statesmen represented their own countries 
and not Europe as such. Nor could there be 
any claim to do so since, according to the press, 
intra-European consultations before and after 
the Guadeloupe meeting were particularly unsat-
isfactory. Such meetings at which the European 
Community as such is not represented but at 
which heads of state or of government of certain 
countries constitute privileged partners for the 
United States President obviously make little 
contribution to agreement between Europeans 
nor to the development of European unity. It is 
quite understandable that the United States 
finds it more convenient to limit such summit 
talks to a few powers and that these should be 
the larger European countries, but the United 
States cannot be unaware that by so doing it 
gives its partners a privileged position which 
others find hard to accept. 
14. In fact, it is not the United States but the 
Europeans who, with their slow stumbling 
progress towards unity, bear main responsibility 
for the hesitations shown by the United States 
in seeking Europe's point of view : it is faced 
by a scattering of states which are often 
incapable of consulting each other. 
15. For all these reasons, Europe is divided 
over two options which have been facing it for 
many years : one is the priority to be given to 
co-operation with the United States as compared 
with the establishment of a European union. 
Naturally, all Europeans believe that both aims 
should be pursued but, depending on circum-
stances, the aspect and the time, they give 
priority to one or the other and so far they 
have never managed to co-ordinate the two aims. 
The second point at issue between Europeans 
is the growing suspicion among some of them 
about the very building of Europe because, 
hidden behind bilateral relations between some 
of their partners and the United . States, they 
believe they can discern a means used by the 
United States to dominate Europe or by certain 
Western European countries to rely on 
American power to strengthen their positions in 
Europe itself. In short, although the need for 
co-operation between Europe and the United 
States is not challenged, the ways and means 
are. 
l 6. In this report, your Rapporteur does not 
intend to propose an overall solution. He 
considers it as pointless to wish to postpone 
co-operation with the United States until the 
day European union exists as to jeopardise this 
union by developing bilateral co-operation which 
takes no account of Europe's decision to move 
towards union. Starting from problems effec-
tively arising today, he wishes to study how 
co-operation between Europe and the United 
States can be pursued and organised parallel 
with real and tangible progress towards Euro-
pean union. 
ll. Economic co-operation 
A. Monetary questions 
17. Until the first world war, gold was the 
monetary standard for all countries engaged in 
international trade and each currency was con-
vertible into gold. After the first world war and 
the accompanying inflation it became impossible 
to restore natural, stable parities between 
national currencies and gold. All were defined 
jn relation to gold at rates which were nominal 
because they were not convertible. However, the 
dollar was less affected by inflation than Euro-
pean currencies and it became the most widely-
used unit of account in international trade. The 
European countries consequently assimilated 
their dollar reserves to gold reserves and this 
had a very strong inflationary effect since the 
dollars accumulated by the central banks were 
generally reinvested in the United States. As 
a result, money spent by Americans was not 
withdrawn from circulation in the United States. 
18. This trend was accentuated during and 
after the second world war, and the Bretton 
'\Voods agreements set up an international 
monetary system based on a fictitious parity 
between the dollar and gold at a level of $35 
per ounce of gold. For better or for worse, this 
system lasted more than twenty years with 
resulting inflation which steadily increased the 
gap between the reality of the money in circula-
tion and the fiction of the exchange rate, to the 
point that in the wake of several European 
5 
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countries the United States had to accept a 
floating rate for the dollar, i.e. no reference 
to a monetary standard. As for all European 
currencies, the value of the dollar now depends 
solely on public confidence in the United States 
economy and hence in the management of the 
United States Government. As a ret>ult, there 
have been extremely wide and sudden fluctua-
tions in the exchange rates of the various western 
currencies between each other. This phenomenon 
has become more marked since October 1973 
due to the spiralling cost of oil and the start 
of a deep-rooted economic recession. 
19. In March 1978, a number of member coun-
tries of the European Community set up a 
European monetary fund designed to keep 
parities between their currencies at a steady 
level. It is yet too early to say whether these 
countries will manage to keep this European 
monetary system going since this would mean 
equal self-control in the management of their 
economies. In the United States, the creation 
of the European monetary fund was initially 
thought to be directed against the supremacy 
of the dollar. But in March 1979 the American 
authorities concerned were able to assure· the 
General Affairs Committee that this was no 
longer the case and that on the contrary they 
considered the attempt to be a positive effort 
to solve the international monetary crisis. In 
fact, the relationship between the dollar and the 
ECU may develop in an atmosphere of rivalry 
which will mean that everything which is 
beneficial to one will be to the detriment of the 
other and vice versa. 
20. In the medium term, at least, the results of 
the United States economy in 1978, with a 
progression of 3.9 % in constant terms in the 
GNP and a drop in the unemployment rate from 
8 % to 5.7 %, might herald a reversal of this 
trend if in 1979 the Americans manage to 
redress the two weak points of their economy, 
i.e. the rate of inflation (7.5 %) and the trade 
balance, whose deficit ($16,000 million) beat all 
records in 1978. Although the deficit in the 
trade balance appeared to be dropping at the 
beginning of 1979, the rate of inflation has on 
the contrary risen 1 • But in the longer term, such 
rivalry would be particularly disastrous as it 
would do absolutely nothing to solve the world 
monetary problem. If by creating the European 
monetary fund the participating countries are 
trying to become a true European partner 
capable of negotiating with the Americans on 
an equal footing to re-establish an international 
monetary system, the fund will play a highly 
1. These figures were given to the Committee by the 
United States Department of the Treasury. They are 
definitely more optimistic than those published in the 
press at the same time (inflation rate : 11.3% ; deficit 
in the trade balance in 1978 : $28,000 million). 
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positive role. If on the contrary the fund helps 
to boost speculation it will then be a destabilising 
factor and may lead the West into a most serious 
monetary catastrophe. 
21. Machinery exists for consultation between 
central banks . and bodies responsible for the 
financial policy of the western states. The IMF 
in particular should play such a role. But this 
can be done only if there is a true will on all 
sides to eliminate monetary anarchy and revert 
to a world monetary system. But although the 
European countries which have decided to take 
part in the new monetary fund seem determined 
to fight inflation vigorously, it may be wondered 
whether, despite the recovery plan adopted in 
October 1978, the United States Administration 
is aware of the problem. Will it be strong enough 
to resist pressure to allow the United States to 
base its economic recovery - which has been 
taking shape for the past three years - on 
inflation 7 If this were to happen the worst fears 
would be confirmed for the monetary, com-
mercial and economic future of the whole 
western world, and consultations in the IMF 
would not change much. 
B. Trade 
22. In Europe, external trade comes within the 
terms of reference of the Community so your 
Rapporteur will not dwell on the matter. 
However, he wishes to recall a few points 
directly governing relations between Europe and 
the United States because, since the Tokyo round 
negotiations are coming to an end, 1979 may 
be strongly marked by the debates on the 
ratification of these agreements in all the 
signatory countries, including the United States 
Congress. While there is a tendency in Europe 
to accuse the United States of pursuing a non-
tariff policy aimed at restricting United States 
imports of products manufactured in Europe, 
the Americans make similar complaints about 
the Common Market, particularly for agricul-
tural produce. 
23. It may be thought that each side embarked 
on the Tokyo round negotiations with the inten-
tion of removing the other's obstacles but on 
both sides of the Atlantic the economic recession 
brought added pressure. Both sides must there-
fore be equally aware of the need to make the 
sacrifices necessary to avoid having to resort 
to protectionism to meet difficulties in national 
economies. 
24. However, the United States' purported 
good will towards the European Community and 
the unification of Europe must be demonstrated 
in the trade field by recognising that unity is 
the vocation of Community Europe, i.e. that the 
reciprocal trade advantages which the member 
countries of the Community offer each other, 
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particularly preferences stemming from the com-
mon agricultural policy and hence the Rome 
Treaty, are based not on protectionism but on 
a political will to achieve unity. To be logical 
with the policy it says it is pursuing, the United 
States Government should consider Community 
Europe as an economic whole and not as an 
organisation of independent states, and it must 
not claim to be a victim of discrimination when 
· Europeans treat intra-Community trade as a 
domestic market. Otherwise, serious misunder-
standings may subsist in trade negotiations 
between Europe and the United States. 
25. Nevertheless, Europe for its part must see 
the customs union on which it based its economic 
unity as a step towards more open markets. It 
is the weakness of the organisation of Europe, 
apart from the customs aspect, that has led 
Europeans to attach too much importance to the 
customs protection 011- which European unity 
has been based and which has made the EEC 
a divisive factor in the international market. 
C. Energy 
26. Since October 1973, the United States like 
the ·western European countries has come up 
against the problem of the shortage of energy 
resources. In fact, the October 1973 crisis merely 
highlighted an extremely serious problem 
caused by the unbridled rise in the consumption 
of energy, particularly oil, by all the industri-
alised countries. This phenomenon was even 
more pronounced in the United States than in 
Europe. 
27. Even if specific political reasons had not 
sparked off the sudden increase in prices at 
the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, the 
shortage would probably have caused a similar 
increase in prices a few months later. But 
because the crisis surfaced through events in the 
Middle East a political solution appeared 
possible. The world took time to realise that this 
was not so and that the ·west could not for ever 
increase its expenditure on energy in such a 
wasteful manner. It is now clear that the era 
of cheap energy has come to an end and con-
sequently it is urgent for industrialised countries 
to redirect their economies along lines which, 
to be effective, must be concerted. 
28. (i) It is essential for all the western coun-
tries to limit their energy consumption, parti-
cularly in cases where it does not serve 
productive purposes. Everywhere the waste of 
light, heat and milage helps to burden the 
balance of payments of industrialised countries 
and heightens the threat of an energy shortage. 
In early 1979, the United States Government 
launched an active propaganda campaign to 
reduce wastage which is a greater problem in the 
United States than in Europe, where there is 
perhaps less wastage but the problem is a real 
one and governments have so far done little to 
encourage the population to reduce consumption. 
In any event, the American authorities made no 
secret of the fact that the campaign has had 
little effect and that they are relying mainly 
on higher energy prices to restrict consumption. 
But does this not mean choosing inflation as a 
temporary measure against waste 1 Can Europe 
afford to follow such a course 1 Even here, where 
mainly internal measures should be taken by 
each state, they should be concerted so as to 
avoid major upheavals in the economies of the 
states concerned. 
29. (ii) Building up reserves is obviously no 
answer to a serious and prolonged crisis but it 
should allow immediate difficulties to be met, 
aa resulted from the Iranian crisis at the 
beginning of 1979, and also ensure the possibility 
of survival in the event of war or a blockade 
of oil supplies. The Western European coun-
tries have made a major effort in this field by 
agreeing to build up reserves corresponding to 
more than two months' consumption. The United 
States, which has oil resources on its own terri-
tory, does not seem to have made a comparable 
effort. It has undertaken not to allow Israel 
to be the victim of a blockade or boycott by 
the oil-producing countries, but this undertaking 
will have its full deterrent effect on the oil-
producing countries only if the United States is 
able to call on large-enough reserves. In 
February 1979, however, President Carter, 
Mr. Brown, Secretary of Defence, and Mr. 
Schlesinger, Secretary of Energy, announced 
military and naval measures designed to allow 
the United States to move quickly to ensure 
that western countries had access to oil from 
the Gulf area should it be threatened. 
30. (iii) It is obviously essential to develop 
alternative forms of energy among which the 
only one which seems to offer prospects of fast, 
large-scale development ];; nuclear energy. 
However, the nuclear energy production pro-
grammes adopted after the 1973 crisis by most 
western countries have everywhere been slowed 
down, held up or stopped by very strong public 
reaction, particularly in areas where new power 
stations were to be built. Nowhere have these 
programmes been fully respected. Nuclear 
energy production certainly involves risks, as 
shown by the incident at Harrisburg on 1st April 
1979, but present-day technology appears to 
allow such risks to be mastered provided all 
necessary steps are taken in time, even if this 
means taking longer to build power stations. 
Further, since the development of nuclear 
energy production is extremely costly, countries 
which have the means of acquiring a complete 
nuclear industry have every interest in finding 
external outlets to help them to amortise the 
cost of their technology. But in many respects 
7 
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these industries depend on patents purchased 
from the United States or on imports of natural 
or enriched uranium which is difficult to obtain 
other than from the United States or one of its 
close allies. It is evident that the policy of 
exporting nuclear energy-producing industries 
involves considerable risk of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the world and it is under-
standable that any country aware of its respon-
sibilities should avoid supplying its customers 
with means of participating in this proliferation 
and ensure that all necessary steps are taken 
to prevent buyer countries from recycling 
plutonium. For this reason, the Americans have 
firmly opposed the policy of exporting nuclear 
power stations pursued by some of their Euro-
pean partners. Because they own the patents and 
control the uranium market they have managed 
to delay and sometimes even prevent the con-
clusion of certain deals. European countries 
victims of these measures readily suspected their 
American ally of using the fear of proliferation 
of nuclear weapons to protect their own indus-
try's markets, thus precluding dangerous com-
petition from their European partners. 
31. It is difficult to sort out the true facts from 
thwarted interpretations in such accusations. But 
what emerges is the need for dialogue and 
agreement between the United States and its 
European partners on nuclear and energy 
policies as a whole and on the type of provisions 
and standards to be included in all contracts 
relating to equipment for countries which do not 
have nuclear weapons, since: 
(a) in face of the oil-producing countries, 
whose coalition has carried considerable 
weight on the international oil market, 
it is in the interests of both the United 
States and Europe, as consumers, to 
concert their approach in order to avoid 
too great a shortage or too fast a rise 
in prices; 
(b) if Europe and the United States are 
to achieve such results, they must 
pursue. a twofold policy of limiting 
energy consumption and accelerating 
the development of alternative sources 
of energy; 
(c) finally, in nuclear matters, all coun-
tries producing nuclear power stations 
must reach agreement on standards to 
be applied to exports of plants of all 
kinds so as to avoid the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons while enabling the 
world capacity to produce nuclear 
energy to expand as quickly and on as 
broad a basis as the requirements of 
security allow. Early action should be 
taken, for several countries are now in 
a position to produce nuclear weapons. 
:. 
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32. On the whole, economic co-operation between 
Europe and the United States is proceeding 
fairly satisfactorily. Where trade is concerned, 
mutual complaints are the subject of overall 
negotiations such as the former Kennedy round 
and the present Tokyo round. These negotiations 
have already produced most important results 
and have above all prevented the present world 
recession from affecting international trade. In 
the monetary field, it is to be hoped that the 
European monetary fund will allow Europe to 
carry more weight in the IMF consultations and 
speed up the search for a new world monetary 
system. ·where energy is concerned, in view of 
the existence of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, there is still a means of controlling 
everyone's activities, and agreement should be 
possible on the limits to be imposed on the 
sale of production plants to third countries. 
33. This does not mean that consultations 
between Europe and the United States are 
satisfactory. There are in fact many weaknesses 
to which both Europe and the United States 
should pay greater attention. But the existence 
of the European Community and the work of 
its Commission mean that in economic matters 
Europe is a relatively well-organised entity and 
a partner which is not without weight in the 
balance with the United States. Whether a 
satisfactory solution will be found to problems 
which will inevitably continue to dominate rela-
tions between Europe and the United States in 
the coming years depends on how far Europe 
can maintain and develop its structure and 
tackle consultations with the United States 
collectively. 
ID. Europe's security 
34. While there may be some economic rivalry 
between Europe and the United States, this is 
obviously not the case for defence. The United 
States can hardly separate the problem of 
Western Europe's security from that of its own 
security any more than Europe can assume 
responsibility for its own defence other than 
in close co-operation with the Americans. The 
framework for co-operation here is the Atlantic 
Alliance and the organisation which stemmed 
from it, NATO. It may be said that in its thirty 
years of existence NATO has worked fairly 
satisfactorily since it has managed to avert war 
in Europe, which was its essential aim. American 
forces have been permanently stationed in 
Europe to guarantee that Europe will be pro-
tected by the United States nuclear deterrent. 
35. However, there have always been differences 
in the European and American view of how the 
Alliance should ensure joint security. This is 
easy to understand if it is recalled that the 
position of the United States shelters it from 
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certain dangers and the threat of invasion or 
war other than nuclear, whereas Europe fully 
realises that any war, whether nuclear or not, 
would cause widespread devastation in Europe. 
On the other hand, its position as a leading 
power confers world-wide responsibilities on the 
United States which Europe has not had since 
the end of the colonial empires. 
A. Strategic problems 
36. These considerations explain certain diver-
gences, or rather different approaches to the 
problems of the Alliance's strategy. For a long 
time, Europe insisted on maintaining the concept 
of massive retaliation as the basis of the 
Alliance's strategy because the threat of the whole 
American nuclear arsenal seemed to be the best 
means of ensuring what was intended to be a 
global deterrent. Progressively, the European 
partners in the Atlantic Alliance came round to 
the concept which the United States had started 
to develop once Soviet missiles began to threaten 
its territory, i.e. graduated response. This 
doctrine is based on the idea that a war will not 
necessarily destroy the territory of the super-
powers and that if it broke out it would be 
possible to contain it at a level determined by 
tacit or explicit agreement between the belliger· 
ents. In short, a distinction could be drawn 
between a world-wide nuclear war, disastrous 
for all, and a European war during which 
negotiations between belligerents would be 
possible. 
37. There is a serious danger of such a doctrine 
making war less improbable and unthinkable 
than with a doctrine of massive retaliation. 
However, it must be noted that the credibility 
of a doctrine of massive retaliation reduced 
considerably with the growth of Soviet nuclear 
power. Who indeed could imagine the Americans 
taking the risk of total destruction of their 
territory and cities in response to a limited 
attack in Western Europe ' The presence of 
American divisions and increasingly diversified 
nuclear weapons on European territory allows 
the deterrent to be graduated so that for each 
level of weapons used in an attack there is an 
appropriate means of response which makes 
retaliation more credible. 
38. To satisfy the Europeans and make them 
accept this doctrine of graduated response, 
NATO, after long and difficult negotiations, 
adopted its forward strategy intended in 
principle, in the event of hostilities, to carry the 
fighting immediately into enemy territory, the 
aim being to make the prospect of limited war 
more acceptable to Europeans. This is still the 
official doctrine of the Alliance but in fact it 
is increasingly necessary to ascertain whether 
it corresponds to real possibilities failing which 
its deterrent value would be naught. Apart from 
the event, difficult to entertain, of members of 
the Atlantic Alliance adopting an offensive 
policy in Europe, forward strategy implies a 
defensive policy based on an offensive strategy 
using appropriate weapons in quantities placing 
NATO clearly above the Warsaw Pact. But it 
is well known that this is not the case and a 
considerable effort would have to be made to 
change the situation. It would take several years 
with the forthcoming budgetary increases 
planned by the United States and a number 
of European countries for their armaments. 
39. Moreover, most recent progress is not in 
offensive weapons but in defensive weapons 
thanks, in particular, to precision-guided missiles 
and the neutron bomb. At the present stage 
of technology, provided large enough quantities 
are available, these new weapons are extremely 
effective against all offensive weapons used by 
ground forces, and particularly tanks. There is 
every indication that the greatest armaments 
efforts in recent years have been directed 
towards precision-guided missiles on which the 
most research has been done. Finally, on 
lOth July 1978, the United States decided to 
manufacture certain components of the neutron 
bomb even if, as the Committee was told in 
Washington, implementing decisions are taken 
only very slowly in view of the reactions of 
Congress. 
40. Such investment implies the choice of a 
defensive strategy, whether it has already been 
made or whether it is subsequently imposed by 
the type of armaments available to NATO forces. 
It is probably reasonable since there would be 
no point in accumulating tanks in a period of 
technical development when such a weapon 
seems more or less condemned. But a choice 
of this kind will have considerable repercussions 
on the Alliance's strategy. It can thus be seen 
that the dominating country within the Atlantic 
Alliance is in fact opting for a strategy which 
is probably perfectly reasonable but differs from 
the one in principle adopted by members of the 
Alliance as a whole. 
41. In recent years, a number of European 
military authorities have expressed very pessi-
mistic views about the ability of NATO forces 
to resist an unexpected Soviet attack, estimating 
at between three and ten days the time it would 
take Soviet tanks to reach the Rhine. Even if 
the Soviet Union is not now thought to harbour 
aggressive intentions, it must be noted that the 
military authorities have rendered a great 
service to all the members of the Alliance and 
have helped to induce several European members 
of the Alliance as well as the United States to 
make a financial effort - however modest - to 
increase their military budgets by 3 % per year 
as from 1978 in constant terms, this increase 
being earmarked essentially for investment in 
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conventional weapons. Information now available 
indicates that this effort has been enough to 
increase considerably the defences of the Atlantic 
Alliance in Europe and hence its possibility to 
deter aggression. 
42. The situation is evidently less clear in the 
case of nuclear matters. The American author-
ities concerned confirmed to the General Affairs 
Committee that they were anxious to draw a 
sharp line between nuclear and conventional 
weapons and, in order to avoid automatic escala-
tion to nuclear war, they emphasised their 
hostility to the "mini-nuke" doctrine at 'one time 
contemplated by American defence authorities. 
Europe cannot consider basing its defence on 
escalation any more than the United States, but 
a defence policy based on deterrence means 
according greater importance to the develop-
ment of cruise missiles which alone can meet the 
challenge of Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire 
bombers. In face of these nuclear weapons, most 
of which are aimed towards Western Europe, 
only the deployment of an adequate number 
of cruise missiles, which are hard to intercept, 
can offer an adequate deterrent. In this respect, 
American determination in the strategic arms 
limitation talks to retain their right to develop 
and deploy cruise missiles will inevitably be 
viewed by Europeans as a test of their true 
wish to defend Europe since only a demonstra-
tion of this wish can act as an effective deterrent. 
Information obtained on this matter by the 
General Affairs Committee makes it impossible 
to conclude with all certainty that the United 
States Government is determined, in the frame-
work of SALT, to retain its ability to deploy a 
defence system in Europe based on cruise 
missiles. Those with whom the Committee spoke 
in the United States made no secret of the fact 
that there was no concerted plan between the 
European members of NATO and the United 
States in this field. 
B. Limitation and control of armaments 
43. At the end of 1978, the United States and 
the Soviet Union succeeded in preparing the 
texts of three agreements which were to bring 
SALT II to an end and mark the beginning 
of SALT III. However, at the beginning of April 
1979, the SALT II agreement had not yet been 
concluded. There is some unease in Europe about 
these negotiations as a whole, probably not 
because of the content of the SALT I and 
SALT II agreements but rather because of a 
number of questions which are inevitably raised 
in the minds of Europeans about the aims of 
United States policy in this domain. 
44. During the General Affairs Committee's 
visit to the United States, American govern-
mental authorities strongly emphasised the fact 
that the SALT agreements were only additional 
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elements in a defence policy and that in no case 
would SALT determine United States defence 
policy. However, Europeans cannot help won-
dering about the ultimate aims of these negotia-
tions and their possible implications for the 
future defence of Europe, particularly as it is 
now clear that the Soviet Union is going to 
ask for French and British nuclear weapons to 
be included in SALT III. 
45. SALT II covered only the limitation of 
strategic weapons, i.e. means of delivery with 
a range of more than 5,500 km. and thus capable 
of reaching American territory from the Soviet 
Union or vice versa. All weapons deployed in 
Europe, consisting mainly of continental 
(medium-range) weapons or tactical (short-
range) weapons, were thus excluded. In recent 
years, the Soviet Union has made considerable 
progress with continental weapons thanks to the 
production of the SS-20 missile which, launched 
from Soviet territory, can reach any target 
whatsoever in Europe and the Backfire bomber 
which has a similar range. 
46. There is therefore a danger of the area 
covered by SALT, i.e. strategic deterrent 
weapons, which would be frozen at their present 
level and in which reductions might subsequently 
be made, being disconnected from medium- and 
short-range weapons, i.e. those used mainly in 
Europe, where there would be no brake on the 
armaments race. Any such disconnection might, 
although this is not at present the aim of the 
Americans, result in the fate of Europe being 
dissociated from that of the United States, 
leaving the Soviet Union with overwhelming 
superiority over. the European allies of the 
United States. 
47. It is therefore becoming increasingly neces-
sary to establish a closer link between strategy 
and the diplomacy of armaments control. 
Apparently the United States has largely 
achieved this but it seems that its European allies 
are still a long way away and the Atlantic 
Alliance has stayed with strategic concepts which 
take insufficient account of the current strategic 
arms limitation talks. 
48. In the United States, the Administration is 
afraid that Congress may blame it for the 
inadequacy of means of verification and super-
vision to be included in the agreement. In 
Europe, there will probably be less criticism and 
reservations about this aspect than about the 
possibility of the deterrent effect of American 
weapons being reduced under the SALT II 
agreements, not to speak of fears of what might 
happen in SALT III. 
C. Armaments co-operation 
49. For several years the American authorities 
have been particularly concerned about achieving 
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co-operation between members of the Atlantic 
Alliance for the joint production of armaments. 
The two-way street formula was adopted under 
the Republican administration for associating the 
two sides of the Atlantic in a common effort. 
The fundamental concepts of this proposal were 
quite clear. On the one hand, cost prices were 
to be cut by extending markets and on the other 
better use was to be made of the military equip-
ment of NATO forces thanks to interoperability 
of weapons of various origins. In general, these 
proposals were welcomed in Europe both because 
of the military requirements they met and of 
the Europeana' wish for lower cw;t prices for 
the weapons needed by their forces. 
50. However, at the same time the European 
countries made a new effort to increase the joint 
production or at least the standardisation of 
their weapons. Their aim was slightly different 
from that of the Americans since it was not so 
much a question of trying to base common defence 
on uniform equipment as of lowering cost prices 
so as to promote and develop a truly European 
armaments industry instead of one shaped on a 
purely national basis as is now the ease. Although 
it may not have been the intention, the American 
proposals might in effect endanger these joint 
production plans because of the size of American 
firms and their much longer production runs. 
In joint production on an Atlantic scale, there 
was a risk of European industries being reduced 
to subcontractor status which, however profitable, 
might allow the United States to gain such a 
lead in research and development that Europe 
could have no hope of regaining its place in 
international competition. 
51. The establishment of the IEPG in Europe 
and the bilateral negotiations between European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance and the United 
States, which led in 1978 to the signature of a 
series of memoranda of understanding, thus 
occurred at the same time and it may now be 
wondered whether the memoranda will not make 
the work of the IEPG even more difficult insofar 
as they may give priority to transatlantic co-
operation, sometimes more advantageous for the 
industries concerned, over truly European co-
operation. 
52. Moreover, the concepts on which this two-
way street is based vary from one side of the 
Atlantic to the other. In the United States, there 
is a growing tendency to consider that there 
must be an overal1 balance between United States 
expenditure on common defence and expenditure 
by the European countries in the United States 
to the same end. But European expenditure con-· 
sists essentially of purchases of military equip-
ment, whereas much of American expenditure 
lies in the cost of maintaining forces in Europe. 
The Europeans, on the contrary, consider that 
the two-way street should, as far as possible, 
bring about a balance between Europe's 
expenditure on armaments in the United States 
and American expenditure on armaments in 
Europe. Under such a concept, there would have 
to be a major change in United States armaments 
procurement policy since so far the quantity of 
weapons purchased by the United States in 
Europe has been very small. 
53. Third, the question arises in the United 
States of how and to what extent the European 
industries should be encouraged to group and 
organise themselves to achieve a size and power 
enabling them to compete with corresponding 
American industries. One school of thought 
accepts some protectionism for the European 
armaments industries insofar as this allows them 
to grow into valid partners or competitors for 
American industry, free competition then becom-
ing the only determining factor in the procure-
ment of all Alliance countries. But another 
school of thought believes that the European 
industries alone will never make this organisa-
tional effort in the framework of a protectionist 
policy and the only way to regroup them and 
rationalise European production is to bring 
Europe face to face with a market in which 
everyone has to meet the same conditions. This 
means all the members of the Atlantic Alliance 
being free to choose the equipment they find the 
most suitable and the cheapest, the two-way 
street thus no longer being an organisation of 
trade but merely an opening up of the market. 
54. Your Rapporteur considers that the aim of 
transatlantic armaments co-operation should be 
to open up and liberalise markets so as to allow 
Buropean armies, as well as the American army, 
to obtain the best equipment at the lowest price. 
However, to achieve such a result quickly, it is 
not certain that the way is to open markets 
completely straight away. He thinks that an 
effort to organise production in Europe as 
envisaged in the framework of the IEPG and 
the broad lines of which should emerge from the 
SAC study is needed before such results can be 
achieved. This means waiting inter alia to know 
more - thanks to the work of the SAC - about 
the various conditions in which European arma-
ments co-operation might be developed. 
55. Your Rapporteur is convinced that the Euro-
pean governments will meet with understanding 
in the. United States if they seriously wish to 
embark on co-ordination of the European arma-
ments industry. If, on the contrary, the work 
of the IEPG and the SAC continues to mark 
time without achieving significant results, the 
wish to form a European armaments industry. 
would be nothing more than a pretext for 
protecting national interests, which would fully 




IV. External policy 
56. Every alliance has a problem of co-
ordinating the foreign policies of its members 
since they are all committed to supporting their 
partners in the event of hostilities with other 
powers. The Atlantic Alliance attempted to solve 
this problem by creating the North Atlantic 
Council. However, since the Atlantic Alliance 
covers clearly-defined areas consultations are an 
obligation regarding those areas alone and in 
fact it has frequently happened that one or other 
member of the Alliance, whether European or 
American has pursued policies in other areas of 
the world which did not at all tally with the 
views of its partners. This has sometimes led 
to serious crises a most characteristic one being 
the confrontatio~ between the United States and 
France and the United Kingdom over the Suez 
affair in 1956. At present, the main problems 
relate to three fields : East-West relations as a 
whole which are admittedly considered regularly 
in the North Atlantic Council but on which 
co-ordination of external policies seems far from 
perfect, the Far East and the Middle East. 
A. East- West relations 
57. The word detente which has been used to 
describe East-West relations in the last fifteen 
years is certainly very ambiguous and it .is natural 
that it should be interpreted differently not only 
by East and West but also ~y th? various 
member countries of the Atlantic Alhance and 
even within these countries by the various parties 
or sections of public opinion. 
58. Certain aspects of· .. East-West relations 
should be studied apart since although they are 
interrelated they pursue separate aims by differ-
ent means. One such aspect is of course the 
limitation of armaments and disarmament. A 
second one is the consolidation of the status quo 
in Europe so that each one may be certain, 
insofar as possible, that the other has no aggres-
sive intentions. A third aspect is that individuals 
should be allowed to escape the power of reasons 
of state to develop to the maximum their eco-
nomic freedom, and their freedom in the arts, 
science and of expression. In short, human rights 
must be able to flourish, bearing in mind that 
they are not merely formal rights guarante:ed 
by the constitutions of most western countnes 
but include requirements of an economic nature 
without which the first would be meaningless. 
59. Since President· Truman defined the policy 
of . containment, the United States has based its 
relations with the Soviet Union and other com-
munist countries on maintaining frontiers as they 
were after the second world war. This desire 
for stability has been an essential factor in the 
trend of East-West relations and seems to be a 
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major objective of the Soviet Union, whereas 
for the West it is but a price to be paid for 
the consolidation of peace. 
60. Conversely, when President Carter took 
office, the United States Government started to 
emphasise other a.c;pects of detente, and showed 
an active interest in what was happening inside 
the eastern bloc and even in individual countries 
including the Soviet Union. The final act of the 
Helsinki conference is typical of the present 
situation since it juxtaposes two principles which 
are not absolutely contradictory but nevertheless 
frequently come into conflict in practice, i.e. non-
intervention in the internal affairs of states and 
the collective responsibility of the signatory 
states for the respect of human rights and free-
dom. 
61. In this connection there is no opposition 
between the Western European countries and the 
United States. All pursue the same aims. There 
is no doubt however that priorities are not 
everywhere exactly the same and Europe now 
attaches increasing value to the maintenance 
and ·development of healthy economic and trade 
relations between Eastern and Western Europe 
although some are sceptical about outside efforts 
to induce the Soviet Union and its allies to have 
greater respect for human rights. On several 
occasions, the United States Administration, 
under pressure from Congress, has envisaged 
economic reprisals against the Soviet Union if 
it failed to show greater willingness to respect 
human rights. These threats have not been 
without avail and it is to be noted, for instance, 
that the number of Soviet citizens authorised to 
emigrate, to Israel in particular, has increased 
considerably in recent years. Similarly, the Soviet 
Government now seems to think twice before 
using more forceful means of curbing dissident 
factions. But even measures of such limited 
effectiveneS3 are possible only if policies are 
permanently co-ordinated. Should the United 
States refuse to deliver certain equipment to the 
Soviet Union and allow its European partners 
to gain control of the markets thus freed, the. 
result would be a de facto disruption of the 
Atlantic Alliance in face of the very danger it 
was formed to fight. One such instance has just 
arisen with regard to France's sale of a computer 
for the forthcoming Olympic Games in Moscow 
which the Soviet Union had ordered from the 
United States and which the latter finally 
refused to deliver. A consensus must therefore 
be found among members of the Atlantic Alliance 
to avoid some of them taking firm stands which 
isolate them and to maintain the cohesion of 
the western alliance outside times such as that 
of the preparation and holding of the Helsinki 
conference when consultations in the NATO 
framework were a worthwhile complement to 
those held by Europeans in the framework of 
the Nine. 
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B. Near and Middle East 
62. The Middle East is now more than ever an 
area of East--West confrontation, but generally 
indirect confrontation in which local factors play 
a decisive part. Whereas it might have been 
thought that developments in Egypt and a 
number of other Arab countries since 1973 would 
have allowed the crises clouding the area since 
the end of the second world war to be progres-
sively settled, several events have allowed or may 
allow the Soviet Union to intervene more actively 
than before, sparking off even more serious 
confrontations than in the past. 
63. This evolution started with the revolution in 
Afghanistan in 1977 and Pakistan's turn towards 
dictatorship. In 1978 there was e-ren more serious 
unrest in Iran following which the Shah had 
to leave the country in January 1979 and make 
way for a regime which has not yet managed 
to assert its control over the whole country. It 
is impossible at the moment to asoortain the 
exact role of the Soviet Union in this series of 
events but there is every indication that the 
Iranian revolution was not directly due to the 
intervention of outside forces. 
64. The unrest and insecurity in Iran led to a 
cut in its oil output and then a total halt in 
exports, which was very serious for the West as 
a whole since Iran was the world's second oil 
exporter after Saudi Arabia. Since the change 
of regime, oil production has picked up again 
but the present government does not wish it to 
return to its 1977 level. Again, it has cancel-
led a large number of contracts under which 
Iran was to have been equipped with modern 
industries and means of transport and thus use 
its profits from oil to become an industrial 
power. 
65. The United States Government appears to 
have taken a long time to realise the full serious-
ness of the crisis and it supported the Shah's 
regime longer than necessary in spite of the 
strong internal opposition to the regime. It sup-
plied the most sophisticated weapons, considering 
Iran as the most reliable outpost of western 
positions in the midst of an area of instability. 
Consequently, the Iranian revolution adopted a 
hostile attitude towards the West and the United 
States in particular, which was accused of having 
intervened in Iran's internal affairs to maintain 
by force a regime which had lost popular sup-
port. 
66. Europe seems to have been quicker to realise 
the threats to the Shah's regime and it was in 
France that Ayatollah Khomeini, who inspired 
the Iranian revolution, took refuge after being 
banished by the Iraqi Government. In France 
he was able to use the press, radio and television 
to spread extremely violent propaganda against 
the Shah's regime. It was thus apparent that in 
autumn 1978 two member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance, France and the United States, 
were pursuing two diametrically-opposed policies 
since one was still supporting the old regime 
whereas the other did nothing to hide its 
assistance to the advocates of revolution in Iran. 
The two countries' attitudes may be judged in 
various ways, but they are characteristic of the 
lack of harmonisation between the foreign 
policies of the United States and Europe. 
67. Relations between Israel and the Arab 
countries have not led to open opposition between 
Europe and the United States but the trend 
of American policy towards Palestinian problems 
has given rise to reservations and fears in 
Europe. It is known that the United States 
Government brought strong pl"e.'3sure to bear on 
the Egyptian and Israeli Governments to induce 
them to take part in the Camp David negotia-
tions which were to lead to the signing of a 
peace treaty between the two countries in 
Washington on 26th March 1979. Naturally, no 
one in Europe disapproves of the search for 
peace between Israel and neighbouring Arab 
countries, but many European observers 
wondered whether President Carter's methods 
for achieving this result might not jeopardise 
the chances of a true settlement. Indeed, 
although the United States Government still con-
siders, as the General Affairs Committee was told 
many times by the American authorities during 
its visit, that the Washington treaty is a step 
towards a more general settlement of all Middle 
East problems and that a sort of peace movement 
was thus set in motion in which the whole Arab 
world would progressively become involved, 
European:; have often felt that, quite the reverse, 
the Washington treaty merely made a general 
settlement more difficult and made absolutely 
no contribution to solving the most serious prob-
lem, that of the Palestinians. They believed it 
might endanger the Arab governments the least 
hostile to a general settlement, increase unrest 
throughout the Arab world as shown by events 
in Lebanon and foster anti-western reactions 
which might inter cilia produce a fast and 
inconsiderate rise in oil prices thus perhaps 
causing a crisis which would be extremely serious 
for Europe. It should be added that there is 
nothing to show that the Israeli Government 
shares the American view that the Washington 
agreements are but a step towards general peace 
and the very fact that two days before the treaty 
was signed it was announced that more Israeli 
colonies were to be established on the West Bank 
indicates that Israel is not at all prepared to 
make more concessions than it has already done. 
68. In short, American policy in the Middle 
East seems dangerous and disputable to many 
Europeans, and certain governments have shown 
- so far discreetly - that they were anxious 
not to be associated with an American policy 
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in which they had no part, while others have 
voiced approval of American policy. 
69. Thus, in the Middle East and Iranian affairs 
there has been a blatant absence of consultation 
and co-ordination between the policies of the 
United States and of its allies, the outcome of 
which might be extremely dangerous for the 
whole western world. 
C. Far East 
70. It is easy to understand that after the Viet-
nam affair the United States has taken the 
greatest care not to become involved in another 
war in the Far East. It is equally evident that 
the Soviet Union has tried to take advantage 
of this situation to extend its influence, parti~ 
cularly as it felt threatened in that area by the 
growth of Chinese power and the increasingly 
hostile attitude of China towards it. At the end 
of 1978, Vietnam, backed by Moscow, invaded 
Cambodia, overthrew the government in office 
and set up a regime favourable to it. China was 
the only country to react to this invasion and 
at the beginning of 1979 launched an offensive 
on its Tonkin frontiers. ' 
71. The United States for its part had for ten 
years or so been drawing closer to China, this 
being marked by President Nixon's visit to China 
and then, after the death of Mao Tse-tung, 
recognition of the People's Republic of China, 
the severing of relations with the Taiwan Govern-
ment and the very rapid development of eco-
nomic relations with the People's Republic of 
China. The United States was not thereby depart-
ing from the policy long pursued by most 
Western European countries which all had 
diplomatic relations with the PeopLe's Republic 
of China and had also considerably increased 
their economic and trade relations in 1978. 
72. The problem now is how far the develop-
ment of friendly relations between China and 
the western countries can and should lead to 
further co-operation in political and defence 
matters. At present, politica1 differences do not 
seem very great since no one seems prepared 
to endorse Chinese ventures in its frontier 
disputes with the Soviet Union or in its ambi-
tions in South-East Asia. Nevertheless, certain 
\Vestern European countries have concluded 
arms contracts with the Chinese Government, 
while the United States Government, fearing that 
the Soviet Union might consider such deals as 
provocation and close western rapprochement 
with China as an encirclement of its territory, 
is proving most reserved about such a policy. 
As long as such arms sales are small, these dif-
ferences are not too serious. But the member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance will have to 
concert their approach to China and Far East 
problems so as not to allow situations to develop 
in the same way as in the Middle East an~ also 
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because their policy :towards China may have 
considerable repercussions on Soviet external 
and defence policy 88 a whole and hence on the 
security of all. 
73. Although necessary, the co-ordination of the 
foreign policies of Europe and the United States 
encounters considerable difficulties. Some are 
psychological because, since the end of the Viet-
nam war, the United States seems determined 
to keep within the strictest limits its commit-
ments in both Asia and Africa but it alone is 
able to supply weapons; guarantees or forces 
which might effectively contribute to preventing 
developments too unfavourable to the West. The 
·western European countries certainly do not 
have the means of taking effective action every 
time there may be a clash with Soviet power. 
74. As a result, serious differences have surfaced 
in various connections and many Europeans now 
seem to be afraid that the United States will 
pursue a policy which no longer guarantees due 
respect for its commitments to its allies. At one 
and the same time Europe is therefore concerned 
about the world balance, maintaining its rela-
tions with the Arab world and the security of 
its oil supplies and how much confidence it may 
have in American commitments. 
V. Conclusions 
75. After this review of the difficulties of co-
operation between Europe and the United States, 
it would be illusory and naive to expect the 
United States to be something different and not 
draw the conclusions it thinks it should draw 
from the recent past, even if many Europeans 
· reach different conclusions. 
76. Europe must realise that for geographical 
reasons and in view of its economic possibilities 
and history the United States cannot share the 
same views on all world problems, be it in eco-
nomics, armaments or external policy. The 
cohesion of the West, which is essential for the 
security of all, can be guaranteed only through 
continuing agreement between the United States 
and Western Europe. But this means that 
Western Europe must really exist. In areas 
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where it has achieved a degree of unity as in 
international trade and perhaps tomorrow mone-
tary matters, it is proving possible and fruitful, 
if not always easy, for Europe and the United 
States to reach agreement based on joint interests 
and compromises between special interests. The 
expected success of the Tokyo round is most 
encouraging in this respect. But in areas where 
Europe has not really talmn shape it is unable 
to exercise the role justified by its commercial 
strength, economic activity and even its efforts 
to help to ensure its own security. Its ability 
to be a true partner of the United States and 
to assert its legitimate interests therefore 
depends on how far it manages to organise itself 
in common institutions and elaborate a European 
policy. Europe's vital interests are certainly at 
stake in matters such 88 the strategic arms 
limitation talks, the international monetary 
system and the search for peace and balance in 
the Middle East. It is clear that the United 
States Government has decided to take account 
of this but it is equally clear that Europe is 
unable to assert its views. · 
77. The establishment of a European monetary 
system may give it the means to do so. 
78. In foreign policy matters, nine-power 
political consultations have not so far achieved 
adequate results, apart from a few cases such as 
the CSCE. 
79. Where defence is concerned, Europe's 
weakness is not due only to its vulnerability 
and to its inadequate troop levels and weapons 
but rather to its institutional inexistence and 
lack of will. Proof of this in 1978 is to be found 
in the way European governments evaded 
adopting a clear stand on the neutron bomb 
when the United States Government sought their 
opinions. The main obstacles to co-operation 
between Europe and the United States lie on 
the European side and it is mainly for Europe 
to find a solution. In the fields in which it is 
already united, Europe can pull its weight as 
a partner. A divided Europe will at best be 
mediocre, commanding but little respect or heed, 
continually complaining about decisions taken 
without it, whereas the United States seems to 
realise fully that European unity is necessary 
to achieve balance in the Alliance which will be 
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